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The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the techniques foreseen in the Basel Agreement II 
(BII) for mitigating the risk of default on bank loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In particular, we 
will conduct an analysis of the effect of the guarantees that the Loan Guarantee Association (LGA) offer to the 
SMEs on the assignment of capital requirements of the financial entities under BII. At the same time, the study 
will examine the effect of this guarantee on the credit risk premium that the financial entities should charge 
their clients, and whether this foreseeable decrease in the interest rates applicable to the SMEs is compensated 
by the cost of the guarantee. 
The results show that, considering that the cost of the LGA guarantee in Spain is around 0.68%, it will 
be advantageous for an SME with the annual sales of less than or equal to €5 million to request this guarantee 
whenever the probability of default (PD) of the LGA is <1.1%, if the approach utilised by the financial entity is 
the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) and the SME is considered as corporate; however, if the SME is included in a 
regulatory retail portfolio, then the limit for the PD of the LGA decreases to 0.71%. On the other hand, when 
the approach utilised is the Standardised one, then will be profitable for an SME treated as retail to request this 
guarantee whenever the PD of the LGA is <3.35% (3.95% for corporate exposures). 
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CREDIT RISK MITIGATION AND SMEs BANK FINANCING IN BASEL II: 
The case of the Loan Guarantee Associations 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a 
Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (hereinafter Basel II or BII). Even today, the new Basel Capital 
Agreement is increasing the concern felt among small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), financial entities, regulators, and national bodies, regarding the effect 
that the new standard will have on the credit policy1. 
One of the goals of BII is to establish capital requirements that are more 
sensitive to risk, which could increase the risk premium that the financial entities 
charge on SMEs. This would increase the rates of interest applied onto their 
loans, and as a result, would exacerbate their very well-known financing 
difficulties. 
To improve the companies’ credit access, firms are obliged to provide 
guarantees or collateral in most of the cases. To mitigate risk, the new 
Agreement allows companies to make use of collateral, guarantees and credit 
derivatives, on-balance sheet netting, mortgages, etc. Thus, it turns out to be 
interesting to banks to know the impact of such techniques on their capital 
requirements, since this could mean that some types of credit-risk mitigation 
techniques are more advisable than others. 
There are various studies in the literature analysing the impact of the 
financing of SMEs on the capital requirements of the financial entities, and its 
possible effects on bank financing. Altman and Sabato (2005) analysed the 
effects of BII on the capital requirements of financial entities using data from the 
USA, Italy, and Australia. They concluded that the banks would have significant 
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benefits in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small- and 
medium-sized firms as retail customers, provided the internal ratings-based 
(IRB) approach is applied. However, for SMEs treated as corporate, the capital 
requirements are considered to be slightly greater than under the Basel I Capital 
Accord. This leads to the assumption, in their opinion, that most financial entities 
would apply both the systems simultaneously; i.e., they would consider one part 
of the credits granted to SMEs as corporate and the other part as retail. Through 
a breakeven analysis, they observed that the banks would be obliged to classify 
at least 20% of their SME portfolio as retail to maintain the current capital 
requirement. According to Berger (2006), the adoption of the advanced IRB 
approach proposed in BII by large credit entities in the USA may not signify a 
reduction in the interest rates applied to the credits granted to SMEs, but may be 
enough to produce a substitution effect with respect to other credit entities of 
smaller size. 
Remarkable studies that have considered BII are those by Altman, Bharath, 
and Saunders (2002); Decamps, Rochet, and Roger (2004); Dietsch and Petey 
(2004); Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004); Lindquist (2004); Repullo and Suárez 
(2004), among others. 
In Spain, Vargas (2001) studied the techniques for credit risk mitigation 
presented in the first consultative document of BII, and Saurina and Trucharte 
(2002, 2004) analysed the consultative documents issued prior to the approval 
of BII, focusing their analysis on the SMEs and their repercussions on the bank 
financing of Spanish companies. They observed that the modifications made in 
2002, considering part of the financing of SMEs as retail or incorporating an 
adjustment for size in the curve corresponding to the corporate category, 
substantially improved the figures of capital requirements demanded, which 
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were reduced on an average to 6.5% for the IRB approach and 6% for the 
Standardised approach for those SMEs included in the retail category. The rest of 
the SMEs included in the corporate category also saw that the capital required 
reduced to 10.23% and 8% for the IRB and Standardised approaches, 
respectively. Thus, they concluded that at least at the level of the Spanish credit 
system as a whole, there were no incentives for a change in the current pattern 
of bank financing provided to companies, although the final effect will depend 
again on the percentage of financing provided to SMEs considered as retail. It is 
worth stressing the point that these results obtained did not take into 
consideration the latest modifications prior to the definitive approval of the 
agreement. 
As a particular case, we will emphasise the guarantee presented in that 
form. It is well known that to reduce the problems derived from information 
asymmetries, there exist entities all over the world that mediate with the banks 
to give guarantees supporting the operations of SMEs. The Loan Guarantee 
Associations (LGAs) act as guarantors of SMEs in dealings with banks, with the 
object of reducing the risks for the financial entities in providing credits to small 
companies; such support helps small companies to get financing under better 
conditions of rate, term, and guarantee (Camino and Cardone, 1999; IDEA, 
2003). In parallel, in many countries, with the aim of offering sufficient cover 
and guarantee for the risks contracted by the LGAs, and to facilitate the 
reduction of the cost of the guarantee for their partners, there exist reinsurance 
companies, whose objective is to provide a second or a backup guarantee for the 
operations guaranteed by an LGA. In Spain, it is the Compañía Española de 
Reafianzamiento, S.A. (CERSA), which provides the second guarantee to the 
banks. 
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As an initial approach, Cardone and Trujillo (2007) considered the impact of 
the guarantees given to SMEs by the LGAs in relation to the capital requirements 
demanded by BII, as well as their possible effects on the risk premium that the 
financial entities apply. They examined the effects on the credit risk premium 
that the banks had to charge to their SME clients, and whether this foreseeable 
theoretical reduction in the interest rates was compensated by the cost of the 
guarantee requested. 
In the context of the European Union, BII was implemented in the form of 
two directives, Directive 2006/48/CE of the European Parliament and Council 
(14/6/06), relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions (recast), and Directive 2006/49/CE of the European Parliament and 
Council (14/06/06), on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions (recast)2. In our study, allusion will be made only to BII and then to 
the corresponding Spanish regulations (the Laws, Royal Decree, and the Bank of 
Spain Circular). 
Section 2 of this study briefly presents the techniques for the mitigation of 
credit risk approved in BII, while Section 3 is an evaluation of the way in which 
SMEs’ bank financing is treated under BII, taking into account the terms of 
capital required. Section 4 is devoted to analysing the impact of the results 
previously obtained on the credit risk premium and, ultimately, on the interest 
rates applicable to SMEs. In Section 5, we have discussed how the guarantee 
granted by the LGAs to SMEs influences the requirements with respect to the 
capital requirements under BII, and have analysed its possible effects on the 
credit risk premium (rate of interest). Section 6 is concerned with estimating the 
cost of the LGA guarantee. Finally, in Section 7 the principal conclusions are 
presented, followed by the bibliographical references. 
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2. Credit-Risk Mitigation Techniques According to BII 
Financial entities use a number of techniques to mitigate the credit risks to 
which they are exposed. For example, exposures may be collateralised by first-
priority claims (in whole or in part with cash or securities) guaranteed by a third 
party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of credit risk. 
Additionally, financial entities may agree to net loans owed to them against 
deposits from the same counterparty. 
The effect of this reduction of risk is that lower requirements of capital 
requirements are imposed under BII. Now the next question is whether all the 
types of guarantee offered by the borrower have equal capacity to reduce the 
risk for the financial entities (Vargas, 2001). 
BII presents several credit-risk mitigation techniques, with acceptance of 
imperfect cover, which constitutes the basis for the approximation between the 
regulatory capital and the economic capital requirements. This basically means 
that the techniques with similar economic effects should also produce similar 
reductions of capital requirements. 
Credit-risk mitigation techniques3 used in BII are: 
a) Collateralised transactions; 
b) Guarantees and credit derivatives4; 
c) On-balance sheet netting. 
In addition to the previous types, the following ones have an advantage of a 
differentiated treatment: 
d) Exposures secured by mortgage and 
e) Asset securitisation. 
Although BII maintains the definition of regulatory capital unchanged, as 
established in BI, the form of determining the assets weighted by risk has been 
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changed considerably. In relation to the credit risk, two main approaches are 
established: the Standardised approach (based on external credit ratings 
provided by recognised rating agencies) and the IRB approach, based on the 
internal credit ratings made by the banks. This latter approach is in turn divided 
into foundation and advanced versions. It is the last version that gives the 
financial entities the maximum scope for calculating and computing for 
themselves the levels of regulatory capital associated with the credit risk. 
The specific treatment given to each of the various types of credit-risk 
mitigation techniques, and hence, to the eligible assets or guarantors may differ 
according to the approach employed by the financial entity (Standardised, 
Foundation IRB, and Advanced IRB), although there are features common to all 
the three of them. In addition, the effect of the different credit-risk mitigation 
techniques on the regulatory capital, based on eligible approaches is also 
described. 
To follow the analysis, refer to the description of the variables in Section 3. 
 
a) Collateralised transactions: The methodology described is the one 
applicable to assets or collateral of financial nature (cash, gold, equities, etc.). 
The loans secured by property assets (mortgage guarantees) are subjected to a 
differentiated treatment (see Table 1). 
Financial entities are allowed to reduce their credit exposure to counterparty 
when calculating their capital requirements to take into account the risk 
mitigating effect of the collateral. In the case of the Standardised approach, 
banks may choose between the two approaches. The first one is a simple 
approach which, similar to the 1988 Accord, substitutes the risk weighting of the 
collateral for that of the counterparty, for the collateralised portion of the 
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exposure (generally subjected to a 20% floor). And the second one, a 
comprehensive approach allows fuller offset of the collateral against exposures, 
by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed to the 
collateral. 
Financial entities may operate under either one, but not both, of the 
approaches in the banking book. Although partial collateralisation is recognised 
in both the approaches, mismatches in the maturity of the underlying exposure 
and the collateral are only allowed under the comprehensive approach. 
If a bank employs the foundation IRB approach for the treatment of the 
credit risk of its portfolio, the methodology for the recognition of eligible financial 
collateral closely follows that outlined in the comprehensive approach to 
collateral in the standardised approach. The financial entities that employ the 
advanced IRB approach will normally take into account the collateral by using 
their own internal estimations with the object of introducing an adjustment on 
the loss given default (LGD) of the exposure. 
[Table 1] 
 
b) Guarantees and credit derivatives: 
A range of guarantors and protection providers are recognised, and under 
the 1988 Accord, a substitution approach would be applied. Thus, only 
guarantees issued by entities with a lower risk weight than the counterparty will 
lead to reduced capital charges, since the protected portion of the counterparty 
exposure is assigned the risk weight of the guarantor or protection provider, 
whereas the uncovered portion retains the risk weight of the underlying 
counterparty. 
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Although the lower probability of suffering a “double default” is recognised, 
it is not taken into account owing to the difficulty of determining the correlations 
between debtor and guarantor. 
For the guarantee (or credit derivative) to be accepted as a mitigator of 
risks, it must be direct, explicit, irrevocable, and unconditional. BII demands a 
series of operational conditions aimed at ensuring the legal certainty of the cover 
(paragraphs 189–193 of BII) (see Table 2). 
[Table 2] 
 
c) On-balance sheet netting: 
BII allows the banks that have legally enforceable netting arrangements for 
loans and deposits to calculate the capital requirements on the basis of the net 
credit exposures, subject to a series of conditions. The assets (loans) will be 
considered as exposures to risks and the liabilities (deposits) as collateral. 
 
d) Exposures secured by mortgage: 
In BII, the treatment of credits secured by property assets is different from 
that proposed generally for credits secured by financial assets, particularly in the 




The treatment of securitisation exposures is presented separately in Section 
IV of BII. Financial entities must apply the securitisation framework for 
determining the regulatory capital requirements on the exposures arising from 
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traditional or synthetic securitisations or similar structures that contain common 
features. 
Since securitisations may be structured in many different ways, the capital 
treatment of a securitisation exposure must be determined on the basis of its 
economic substance rather than its legal form. 
 
3. The Treatment of SMEs in BII 
Under BII, an SME is understood as a company where the reported sales for 
the consolidated group of which the firm is a part is less than €50 million. Again, 
the way an SME is treated will differ according to the approach chosen by the 
particular financial entity, Standardised or IRB, and according to whether the 
bank includes the SME in the corporate or retail category. 
 
a) Standardised approach: 
The financial entities must classify their exposures to risk according to 
various groups, and establish weights based on the credit rating given to the 
SME by an external credit-assessment institution (see Table 4). 
[Table 4] 
BII leaves it to the discretion of the national supervisor to allow financial 
entities to risk-weight all corporate claims at 100%, without regarding the 
external ratings. 
Finally, SMEs included in a regulatory retail portfolio may be risk-weighted 
at 75%, except for the past due loans. 
 
b) IRB approach 
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The IRB approach is based on the internal estimations made by the financial 
entity, which allow the bank to calculate capital requirements that are more 
sensitive to the risk. 
The Committee has made two IRB approaches available: a foundation and 
an advanced. Under the foundation approach, banks provide their own estimates 
of probability of default (PD) and rely on the supervisory estimates for other risk 
components: the loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD), and 
the effective maturity of the operation (M). Under the advanced approach, banks 
provide more of their own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD, and their own calculation 
of M, subject to meeting minimum standards. 
For both the foundation and advanced approaches, banks must always use 
the risk-weight functions provided in BII for the purpose of deriving capital 
requirements. 
With respect to the variables described, the following comments are 
relevant: 
− Probability of default (PD): PD must be a long-run average of 1-year 
default rates for borrowers in the grade. The length of the underlying 
historical observation period used must be at least 5 years, and the bank is 
permitted to apply for its calculation by one or more of the following 
techniques: i) internal default experience; ii) mapping to external data; or iii) 
statistical default models. The PD is the greater of the 1-year PD associated 
with the internal borrower grade to which that exposure is assigned, or 
0.03%. 
− Loss given default or severity (LGD): LGD must be measured as a 
percentage of the EAD. Under the foundation approach, senior claims on 
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corporates not secured by recognised collateral will be assigned a 45% LGD, 
or 75% if the credit is subordinated. 
− Exposure at default (EAD): Under the foundation IRB approach, for on-
balance sheet items, the EAD is equal to the nominal amount of the 
operation. All exposures are measured as gross of the specific provisions or 
partial write-offs. 
− Effective maturity of the operation (M): For banks using the foundation 
approach for corporate exposures, M will be 2.5 years. In the case of 
advanced IRB approach, M (in years) must be estimated, but this will not be 
>5 years. 
 
The formulation to calculate the regulatory capital proposed by BII (see 
Table 5) includes the unexpected losses5, for which capital is required to be 
assigned by the financial entity. 
[Table 5] 
The function (Equations [3] and [5]) is derived from an adaptation of 
Merton’s (1974) single-asset model to credit portfolios. The confidence level is 
fixed at 99.9%, i.e., an institution is expected to suffer losses that exceed its 
level of capital on an average once in 1000 years. 
R is the coefficient of asset correlation and is introduced to reflect a 
"portfolio effect," such that the greater this coefficient, the greater the capital 
required for the same PD. Correlations are adjusted to firm size, which is 
measured by annual sales. The linear size adjustment, shown in Equation [4] as 
0.04 × (1 − (S − 5)/45), affects corporates with annual sales of less than €50 
million (SMEs). For SMEs with annual sales of €5 million or less, the size 
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adjustment takes the value of 0.04, thus lowering the asset correlation from 
24% to 20% (best credit quality) and from 12% to 8% (worst credit quality). 
The second part of Equation [3] shows the adjustment for the maturity of 
the loan. Both the intuition and empirical evidences indicate that long-term 
credits are riskier than the short-term ones. As a consequence, the capital 
requirement should increase with maturity. The M is the effective term or 
maturity of each operation, and [ ]2)(ln05478.011852.0 PDb ⋅−=  
With the aim of maintaining the current aggregate level of capital 
requirement in general terms, the BCBS decided to apply a 1.06 scaling factor 
for credit risk-weighted assets (calibration) in the IRB approach (May, 2006). 
Once the capital requirement has been estimated, to derive risk-weighted 
assets (RWAs), it must be multiplied by EAD and the reciprocal of the minimum 
capital ratio of 8%, i.e. by a factor of 12.5. 
Table 6 shows the capital requirement (CR), in %, for a loan to an SME 
according to different probabilities of default (0.03% and 20%) and different 
levels of total annual sales (less than €5 million, €30 million, and €50 million). It 
can be observed that the risk-weighting ranges between 11.98% and 199.72%, 
13.79% and 230.24%, and 15.31% and 252.53%, respectively. It has been 
assumed that the loss in the event of default is 45%, and that the effective 
maturity of the loan is 2.5 years (both the data fixed by the regulator for the 
foundation approach). 
[Table 6] 
In the case when the financing granted to the SME is included in the retail 
category, the formula given in Equation [5] is used for calculating the regulatory 
capital. It should be observed that this function does not include an explicit 
maturity adjustment. For the retail positions, banks must provide their own 
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estimators of PD, LGD, and EAD, i.e., there is no distinction between a 
foundation and an advanced approach for this asset class. In addition, as in the 
case of financing provided to firms, a minimum PD of 0.03% is established. 
Table 7 shows a simulation of different levels of CR demanded (PD of 0.03% 
and 20%) for a loan to an SME included in the retail category. Again, the LGD is 
assumed as 45%. 
[Table 7] 
From the examination of the different curves of capital, it can be observed 
how the own funds required are reduced in line with the dropping levels of 
annual sales in the borrower company – the differences between the curves 
being greater when the probability of default increases. 
When the financing to the SME is considered as retail, the CR in both the 
approaches, Standardised and IRB, drops considerably. 
 
4. Quantification of the Credit Risk Premium 
The credit risk premium is the sum of two components6: 
CRROELGDPDemiumRiskCredit ⋅+⋅=(%)Pr  [7] 
where 
PD: Probability of default 
LGD: Loss given default, as a percentage of the EAD. 
ROE: Return on Equity. 
CR: Regulatory capital "consumed" by the credit (i.e., the capital requirement 
specific to the loan), as a percentage of the EAD. 
 
Analysis of each component of the credit risk premium: 
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i) The expected loss (EL) represents an average value of the expected 
losses owing to credit risk in 1 year from an economic perspective. It is 
estimated as the product of three variables already known: 
Expected loss (EL) = EAD x PD x LGD [8] 
Financial institutions view EL as a cost component of doing business, 
and manage them by a number of means, including through the pricing of 
credit exposures and provisioning. With respect to this, the amount 
imputable to the borrower in terms of “foreseen loss,” as a percentage of 
the exposure to the risk, would be equal to PD × LGD. 
ii) The cost of the regulatory capital7 that the loan in question 
"consumes," is obtained by multiplying this capital by any variable 
representative of the return required from it, for example, by the ROE 
ratio. 
The financial entity must also consider the possibility of a "not 
expected loss" (unexpected loss or UL), derived from the volatility 
associated with the probability of default. This UL will be reflected in the 
assignment of own funds that constitutes the regulatory capital. Capital is 
needed to cover the risks of such losses, and therefore, it has a loss-
absorbing function. 
Interest rates, including credit risk premium, charged on credit 
exposures, should absorb the cost of these capital requirements. 
 
Once the components that comprise the credit risk premium have been 
analysed, its amount for the SME as a function of the new capital requirements 
demanded by BII is quantified. According to the data from the Bank of Spain, the 
average ROE of Spanish financial entities during 2007 was 19.9%. If the LGD is 
 16 
45%, then the credit risk premium is quantified for the Standardised and IRB 
approaches, as shown in Table 8. 
[Table 8] 
It can be observed that at higher rates of insolvency, the financial entities 
need a higher CR, and the higher rates of interest are applied to loan operations 
with SMEs. 
− Standardised approach: The banks should charge the SME borrower (without 
credit rating) a higher credit risk premium, if the IRB approach was chosen in 
the lower sections of the curve, with lower probabilities of default. 
− IRB approach: At a similar probability of default, the SME borrowers with 
lower annual sales will benefit more in terms of differential of interest, 
although it should be remembered that, in principle, the lower the annual 
sales volume of the SME, the higher is its probability of bankruptcy, ceteris 
paribus. In this way, BII tries to alleviate the burden represented by the new 
capital requirements for companies of small size as much as possible, by not 
excessively increasing the consequent risk premium. 
 
5. The LGA in BII 
The study conducted by Cardone, Casasola, and Samartín (2005) on a 
sample of 400 Spanish SMEs revealed that about 70% of the SMEs were required 
to present some type of credit-risk mitigation when requesting a loan. This 
requirement is more frequent for the smallest companies (85% of the micro 
companies, as against 51% of the companies of medium size). With respect to 
the type of credit-risk mitigation required, the most frequent are the guarantees 
(mainly monetary) not associated with the principal activity of the business. The 
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collateralised transactions (mostly mortgages) hardly accounted for 20% (see 
Table 9). 
[Table 9] 
The importance of the guarantee in financing appears to be strengthened 
under BII. As we analysed previously, for the loans guaranteed by any entity, 
the capital requirements are generally lower than for those collateralised by 
some type of asset, by mortgage or otherwise. Thus, for example, in the 
Standardised approach, the loans guaranteed by an entity of recognised 
creditworthiness will usually be weighted by 20%, against 35% for the credits 
secured by the residential mortgage (or by 50%, in exceptional cases, if the 
property mortgaged is commercial). 
It is in this context that the guarantee awarded by an LGA becomes 
important. BII allows the effect of this cover to be taken into account, although 
both the guarantee and the LGA must meet a series of requirements for a 
reduction in the CR to be obtained. The treatment given to the loans guaranteed 
by an LGA is similar to that generally established for the guarantees and credit 
derivatives analysed in Section 2. 
 
a) Standardised approach 
Given that it is a guarantee, the "principle of substitution" is applied, which 
means that the operation guaranteed by an LGA is assigned the risk-weighting of 
the particular LGA involved. In the event that the guarantee is only partial, the 
uncovered portion of the exposure will retain the risk-weighting of the SME. 
The risk-weighting applicable to the LGA will depend on their juridical 
status, which will determine the inclusion of the LGA in one category of risk or 
another8. 
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If the LGA is configured as a public sector entity (PSE) or an administrative 
body, or as a non-commercial company owned by the Government, it may be 
appropriate to treat these claims in the same manner as the claims on banks, if 
the LGA is subjected to strict lending rules and a declaration of bankruptcy is not 
possible because of their special public status. Those LGAs taking the form of a 
mercantile company, but considered as credit institution by the supervisors 
(around 50% of the LGAs in Europe, including in Spain) may also be treated in 
the same manner. 
In these cases, BII establishes two options, which the national supervisors 
must apply to all the entities over which they have the jurisdiction. 
− Option 1: A risk-weighting corresponding to a category less favourable than 
that assigned to the sovereign debt of that country is applied to the LGA9. 
− Option 2: The second option bases the risk-weighting on the external credit 
assessment of the LGA itself with claims on unrated LGA being risk-weighted 
at 50%. Under this option, a preferential risk-weight that is one category 
more favourable may be applied to claims with an original maturity of ≤3 
months, subjected to a floor of 20%10. These two options are summarised in 
Table 10. 
[Table 10] 
Therefore, for a loan to an SME that is not rated and wholly guaranteed by 
an LGA possessing the status of credit institutions, if the supervisor opts for the 
first of the two options in countries with a sovereign debt rating of AA or better, 
the CR will be: 
 
20% × 8% = 1.6% of the amount financed, against: 
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100% × 8% = 8.0% or 6 % depending on whether the SME is treated as 
corporate or retail. 
 
In this case, the amount guaranteed by the LGA is lesser than the amount 
of the loan, the bank and the LGA share losses on a pro-rata basis, and the 
capital relief will be afforded on a proportional basis. An adjustment will also be 
applicable when the systems of guarantees only provide protection for a period 
less than the maturity of the loan11. 
 
b) IRB approach 
The treatment of the guarantee provided by an LGA differs depending on 
whether the financial entities utilise the values provided by the supervisors for 
the loss in the event of default or LGD (foundation IRB), or employ their own 
internal estimations (advanced IRB). 
Under either of the approaches, credit risk mitigation in the form of 
guarantees must not reflect the effect of double default. Thus, if the bank 
recognises the guarantee, the adjusted risk-weight must not be less than that of 
a comparable direct exposure to the guarantor, in this case, the LGA. 
 
b.1) Foundation IRB 
The financial entities that utilise the foundation IRB approach for calculating 
their regulatory capital will recognise the guarantees provided by the LGA in the 
following way: 
− The risk-weighting will be derived from the covered portion of the loan 
utilising: 
• The risk-weighting function appropriate for the LGA and 
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• The PD corresponding to the LGA or any intermediate rating between that 
of the SME and LGA, if the bank deems a full substitution treatment not to 
be warranted. 
− The bank may replace the LGD of the underlying transaction with the LGD 
applicable to the guarantee, taking into account the seniority and any 
collateralisation of a guaranteed commitment. 
The risk-weighting and the LGD associated with the SME will be assigned to 
the part not covered by the guarantee. The protection is thus partially 
recognised, as it would occur in the Standardised approach. At the same time, 
any mismatch between the term of the operation and the duration of the 
guarantee will be taken into consideration. 
 
b.2) Advanced IRB 
Banks using the advanced approach for estimating LGDs may reflect the 
risk-mitigating effect of guarantees through either adjusting PD or LGD 
estimates12. 
However, in contrast to the foundation approach, guarantees prescribing 
conditions under which the guarantor may not be obliged to perform (conditional 
guarantees) may be recognised under certain conditions. 
 
b.3) Retail Exposures 
The treatment proposed under BII for mitigating retail risks in the event of 
guarantees is very similar to that proposed for those financial entities that 
choose to make their own estimations of the LGD. Banks may reflect the risk-
reducing effects of guarantees, either in support of an individual obligation or a 
pool of exposures, through an adjustment of either the PD or LGD estimate, if a 
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series of minimum requirements are met and with the prior approval of the 
competent authorities. 
There are no restrictions on the types of eligible guarantors, if they meet 
the conditions established by the regulation, which are the same as under the 
advanced IRB approach. 
 
c) Reinsurance systems 
In Europe,13 rather more than half of the guarantee systems (56%) have 
some kind of reinsurance, although in most cases this does not cover 100% of 
the operation14, a requirement demanded under BII to alleviate the capital 
requirements in the Standardised approach. 
However, it is clear that the backup guarantee represents a significant 
support to the creditworthiness of the LGA, and this fact is even recognised by 
the Spanish regulations15. In particular, it is recognised that, when a series of 
conditions are met, reinsurance is an instrument that reduces the credit risk, and 
consequently should lead to a reduction of the own resources (of the LGA) 
required with respect to those commitments that benefit from general contracts 
of second guarantees or reinsurance. 
This signifies that the backup guarantee constitutes a variable to be 
considered when the bank estimates the PD or LGD applicable under the internal 
rating or IRB approach, except where the national legislation stipulates to the 
contrary. Thus, those SMEs endorsed by an LGA whose guarantees are in turn 
guaranteed to a significant percentage by any reinsurance company should 
benefit from the lower capital requirements by the lender financial entity. 
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Thus, having analysed the impact of the LGA guarantee on the CR 
demanded of financial entities for loans to SMEs, the next step is to determine its 
effect on the credit risk premium previously calculated. It has already been 
shown how the reduction of risk (as a consequence of the existence of the 
guarantee of the LGA) is translated into reduced capital requirements and, 
ultimately, into lower risk premiums (interest rates) chargeable to the SMEs, 
thus reducing the cost of credit for the SMEs. 
The precise quantification of the new credit risk premium will depend not 
only on the value taken by the basic variables of the risk (mainly the PD and the 
LGD) for the endorsing LGA, but also on the approach that the bank employs for 
risk management (Standardised, foundation IRB, or advanced IRB approach) 
with respect to the component of "not expected losses." 
It is almost certain that the probability of default of the LGA will be lower 
than that of the borrower SME; hence, the amount of the EL (the first 
component of the credit risk premium) should be considerably reduced. If the 
possible existence of reinsurance is added to this, and since both the SME and its 
endorsing LGA would need to become insolvent for the financial entity not to 
recover its money, the expected value of any loss would be even lower. 
For the average values of the Spanish market for credit and different values 
of the PD of the guaranteeing company16, the element of EL to be included in the 
credit risk premium has been simulated in Table 11. Assuming the average rates 
of default for SMEs as 2.64%, and as 2.92% for those companies with the due 
amount of more than (or less than) €1 million17, the differences in the expected 
losses for credits guaranteed by an LGA range from 1.17% (1.30%), for very 




With respect to the second component of the credit risk premium, which is 
representative of the cost of the capital required, its amount does differ now 
according to the approach that the financial entity chooses for the management 
of the risk. 
In countries like Spain (with AAA rating), the factor for UL of the credit risk 
premium would be reduced by 1.27% and 0.88% for the SMEs included in the 
corporate and the retail category, respectively, in the event of opting for the 
Standardised approach and assuming that: i) the LGA is classified as a credit 
institution; ii) the loan operation is guaranteed for 100% of the amount, during 
the full life of the loan; and, finally, iii) the option chosen by the supervisor for 
claims on banks is the first (see Table 12). 
[Table 12] 
If the bank opts for the IRB approach, the quantification of the second 
element of the credit risk premium will depend, as we already know, on the PD 
of the LGA in question. It is assumed, as we already noted, that this should be 
lower than that of the SME guaranteed, causing a bigger reduction in the 
premium with the bigger difference between the two PDs. Thus, for an average 
rate of insolvency for the SME of 2.64%, and LGA of 0.03% (lower limit of the 
PD), the difference in the component of UL will be 1.36% for an SME with the 
annual sales of less than or equal to €5 million, and 1.85% if the annual sales of 
the company are around €50 million. 
When the SME is treated as retail for the purposes of calculating the 
regulatory capital, for an average rate of default of 2.92%, the component of the 
premium for UL is reduced to 1.06%, and this factor could be reduced to 0.82% 
for an SME endorsed by an LGA. 
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As the PD of the LGA takes higher values (meaning that its credit rating 
gets worse), the differences become lower to the point where an average rate of 
default for the LGA of 1.07% makes the element of UL of the credit risk premium 
of an endorsed SME (with annual sales lower than €5 million and active risk of 
more than €1 million) equal to that of another without guarantee (see Table 13). 
[Table 13] 
Table 14 shows a summary of the estimated credit risk premiums (with 
average data for Spain) for the credits to SMEs guaranteed by an LGA, for 
different levels of creditworthiness. Although the differences with respect to the 
SMEs that are not endorsed depend on the approach employed by the bank for 
calculating its CR, these are about 2–3% for operations supported by an LGA 
with PD of 0.03%. When the creditworthiness of the LGA is worse, the 
differences narrow, to the point where, if the LGA has a PD of more than 2.64% 
(the average PD for the SMEs), the new credit risk premiums will exceed those 
for the SMEs that are not endorsed, in the IRB approach. 
[Table 14] 
 
6. Determining the Cost of the LGA Guarantee 
Having reached this point, the subsequent questions are: What is the cost 
of the guarantee for the SME, and is this cost compensated by the reduction of 
the risk premium previously calculated that, in theory, the financial entity should 
translate into a lower rate of interest for an operation guaranteed by an LGA? 
In guarantee systems of mutual type, like the Spanish one, those SMEs that 
are inclined to obtain a guarantee from an LGA must necessarily become 
partners (i.e. must participate in the ownership). However, once the credit has 
been amortised, the company can request the return of its participation. These 
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recoverable contributions (subscription quota or SQ) represent an opportunity 
cost for the SME borrower. 
In addition, the SMEs that request a guarantee from an LGA must do so 
against a series of non-recoverable costs, specifically: 
• The study commission (SC), charged as a percentage on the amount of 
guarantee requested, which is intended to reimburse the LGA for 
conducting a study of the viability of the project; this cost is incurred 
irrespective of whether the guarantee is finally conceded or not. It is paid 
only once, when the operation is requested. 
• The commission in the concept of guarantee (GC), which is usually 
charged as a percentage of the amount due at the beginning of each 
accounting period; this is payable annually by the SME during the term of 
the guarantee. Its objective is to cover the possible insolvency of the 
partner endorsed and will depend on the method of amortisation of the 
loan granted by the financial entity. 
To make it feasible to compare these costs with the credit risk premiums 
previously calculated, we must estimate the cost of the guarantee as an effective 
annual amount (IRR). This is given by the following equation of n degree: 




















0 121  [9] 
where 
A:  Amount of the guarantee 
SQ:  Subscription quota to the capital of the LGA 
SC:  Study commission 
GC:  Guarantee commission 
ADt: Amount due for the loan guaranteed at the beginning of year t 
n:  Term of the loan (in years) 
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In the most usual case of amortisation of a loan with constant annual 
repayments (French system) and for average data of the Spanish market for 
2007, the result obtained after applying Equation [9] is 0.68% (see Table 15). 
[Table 15] 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The application of BII will bring important consequences for: i) the bank 
lenders, ii) the SME borrowers, and iii) the reciprocal guarantee companies, 
which are financial intermediaries whose importance is increasing and which 
appear, practically, all over the countries in the European Union. 
i. For the financial entities, BII means working in a more stable financial 
environment. Once the financial entities have learnt how to measure, cover, 
and appropriately manage the risks to which their operations are exposed, 
they should face fewer situations of default; but if these situations do occur, 
they should be better placed to deal with them. 
ii. For the SMEs, BII means the payment of premiums according to the risk of 
their business initiatives. In the past, the alternative involved restrictions in 
their access to credit, arising specifically from the difficulty that calibrating 
that risk presented for the financial entities. At the same time, the SMEs will 
need to be instructed in the management of risk, knowing that the lender will 
assess them in that respect. 
iii. In the face of the challenge of BII, the LGAs must accept that, like the SMEs 
they guarantee, they may need to submit themselves to the same processes 
of measurement of risk as those to which their associates are submitted, i.e., 
at a credit rating. 
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The guarantee appears to be strengthened under BII. Generally, the loans 
guaranteed by another financial entity, like an LGA, will need backing by reduced 
amounts of regulatory capital when compared with those loans collateralised by 
assets (financial or not). Thus, if the financial entity applies the Standardised 
approach, the loans guaranteed by an LGA will usually be weighted by 20%, 
against 35% for the credits secured by a residential mortgage, or 50% in 
exceptional cases, if the property mortgaged is commercial. 
Consequently, it is clear that when the credit to the SME is conceded with 
the guarantee of an LGA, this will reduce, in principle, the capital requirement 
demanded from the financial entity, although its final effect on the credit risk 
premium will depend on both: 
a) The values taken by the credit variables of the LGA (principally the 
PD and the LGD) and 
b) The approach that the financial entity employs for the management 
of the risk (Standardised, foundation IRB, or advanced IRB). 
 
In the case of Spain: 
− If the financial entity applies the Standardised approach, it can be assumed 
that the factor for UL of the credit risk premium is reduced by: 
1.27% for the SMEs included in the corporate category and 
0.88% for the SMEs considered as retail. 
− When the IRB approach is applied, the amount of the UL will depend on the 
probability of default of the LGA. For an average rate of insolvency for the 
SME of 2.64%, and for the LGA of close to 0% (the best of the cases), the 
difference in the component of UL will be 1.36% for an SME with annual sales 
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of less than or equal to €5 million, and 1.85% if the annual sales of the 
company are up to €50 million. When the SME is treated as retail for the 
purpose of calculating the regulatory capital, then for an average rate of 
default of 2.92%, the component of the credit risk premium for UL is reduced 
to 1.06%; and this factor could be reduced to 0.82% for an SME guaranteed 
by an LGA. 
 
If the component of EL (provisionable) is added, the credit risk premium is 
reduced on an average by 2–3% for operations guaranteed by an LGA whose PD 
is close to 0.03%. As the creditworthiness of the LGA gets worse, the differences 
get narrower, to the point that, for an LGA with PD of more than 2.64%, the new 
credit risk premiums exceed those of the SMEs not so guaranteed, in the IRB 
approach. 
Considering that the cost of the LGA guarantee in Spain is around 0.68% 
(according to data for 2007), it will be advantageous for an SME with the annual 
sales of less than or equal to €5 million to request this guarantee whenever the 
PD of the LGA is <1.1%, if the approach utilised by the financial entity is the IRB 
and the SME is considered as corporate; however, if the SME is included in a 
regulatory retail portfolio, then the limit for the PD of the LGA decreases to 
0.71%. On the other hand, when the approach utilised is the Standardised one, 
then will be profitable for an SME treated as retail to request this guarantee 
whenever the PD of the LGA is <3.35% (3.95% for corporate exposures) (see 
Table 14). 
It is, therefore, necessary for the banks to make a detailed and meticulous 
analysis of the creditworthiness of the various LGAs, to determine their PD. 
Thus, it follows that in those countries that adopt BII, it is also necessary for the 
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development of credit agencies to be strengthened, for rating both SMEs and 
their financial intermediary guarantors, the LGA. 
In this context, it also seems clear that the reinsurance companies have an 
important role to play in reinforcing the creditworthiness of the LGA; this 
importance has been recognised by some countries like Spain, in the legislation 
for implementing BII. The SMEs endorsed by an LGA, whose guarantees are in 
turn guaranteed to a significant percentage by a reinsurance company, should be 
rewarded with lower capital requirements by the lender, considering that this 
backup guarantee should be taken into account by the financial entity in the 
calculation of the PD or LGD when the IRB approach is used. 
 
Notes 
1. The importance of SMEs for the BCBS is evident from the various 
modifications that have been made to BII over the course of its development, 
with the object that the Agreement should not turn out to be too prejudicial 
for these companies, in terms of the capital required. The formulas for 
calculating the regulatory capital associated with SMEs by the banks have 
been modified thrice (in the consultative documents of 2001, 2003, and 
2004). 
2. These directives were incorporated into the Spanish juridical provisions 
through the issue of two new laws: i) for the sector of credit entities, the Law 
36/2007 (16/11/07) [which modified the Law 13/1985, of 25 May] of 
investment coefficients, own resources and information obligations of 
financial intermediaries, and other rules for the financial system; and ii) for 
the sector of investment services companies, the Law 47/2007 [which 
modified the Law 24/1988, of 28 July] of the Securities Market. Finally, the 
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Royal Decree 216/2008 of 15 February, on the own resources of financial 
entities and the Circular 3/2008 of the Bank of Spain, completed the legal 
regulation, and from these acts and dates, all the cited regulations were put 
into effect. This "scalar transposition" culminated the incorporation of BII into 
the relevant Spanish legislation. 
3. Bindseil and Papadia (2006) presented the principal credit-risk mitigation 
techniques utilised by almost all the central banks of the world. According to 
the authors, these coincide with most of those presented in BII. 
4. The difference between collateral and guarantees and credit derivatives is 
that, in the case of the first, the financial entity receives an asset that it will 
be utilised in the event of default by the borrower. In the case of the second 
type, guarantees or credit derivatives, the guarantee is based only on a 
promise of payment (Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, 2001). In 
addition, the financial entities may accept the compensation of loans by 
means of deposits made by the same customer. 
5. While the expected loss represents the foreseeable loss from the operation 
from a statistical perspective, the unexpected loss refers to the variations 
that the expected loss may present beyond what has been estimated. 
6. Financial entities can set limits to the risk that they are willing to assume, 
even if an adequate risk premium has been calculated. 
7. A more exact determination of the credit risk premium would involve using 
the concept of economic capital instead of regulatory capital (Martín and 
Trujillo, 2004). 
8. The credits guaranteed by the Government, whether central, regional, or 
local, will receive the most favourable treatment: it will not be necessary for 
 31 
the bank to assign capital in the event that the rating of the State is AA or 
better. 
9. However, for claims on banks in countries with sovereigns rated from BB+ to 
B− and on banks in unrated countries, the risk-weight will be capped at 
100%. 
10.Supervisors should ensure that claims with (contractual) original maturity of 
<3 months, which are expected to be rolled over (i.e., where the M is >3 
months) do not qualify for this preferential treatment for capital adequacy 
purposes. 
11.Maturity mismatches between the loan and the guarantee will only be 
recognised in those LGAs that cover at least 1 year of the life of the credit, 
which means that, for short-term loans, the duration of the cover must be 
equal to that of the underlying operation. 
12.The criteria for adjustment must be clear, plausible, and intuitive, and must 
address the LGA’s ability and willingness to perform under the guarantee. The 
criteria must also address the likely timing of any payments and the degree 
to which the LGA’s ability to perform under the guarantee is correlated with 
the borrower’s ability to repay. The bank’s criteria must also consider the 
extent to which residual risk to the borrower remains, for example, a 
currency mismatch between the guarantee and the underlying exposure. 
13.BII recognises the possibility that the countries that decide so may apply a 
lower risk-weighting to the set of credits endorsed by an LGA that is in turn 
counter-guaranteed indirectly by the Government, central, regional or local, 
through a reinsurance system. 
14.The CERSA provides backup guarantees for the financial operations 
underwritten by the LGAs, to different percentages of cover according to the 
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type of operation. The cover for operations ranges from 30% to 75%; new 
company operations and those of innovative character enjoy more cover. The 
contracts establish a maximum cost of the cover calculated in function of a Q 
quality rate in the management of the risk. 
15.Royal Decree 216/2008, of 15 February, with respect to the own resources of 
financial entities. 
16.It is assumed that the LGD does not vary between the two situations, which 
is a restrictive hypothesis, since one would expect that its amount should be 
lower in an SME guaranteed by an LGA, since the financial entity in majority 
of the cases could be expected to recover at least some part of the amount 
loaned from both the SME and its LGA (which could even be backed up by a 
public system of reinsurance). 
17.For the period 1995–2000, in Spain (Saurina and Trucharte, 2002). 
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- Deposit in the 
financial entity 
- Gold  
- Sovereign debt 
instruments with a 
rating of BB- or better 
- Other debt securities 
with a rating better 
than BBB- 
- Debt securities 
without external 
rating these are listed 
on a recognised 
exchange. 
- Equities (including 
convertible bonds) 
that are included in a 
main index. 
- For collateral to be recognised in the simple approach, the collateral must 
be pledged for at least the life of the exposure and it must be marked to 
market and revalued with a minimum frequency of six months. 
- Those portions of claims collateralised by the market value of recognised 
collateral receive the risk weight applicable to the collateral instrument. 
- The risk weight on the collateralised portion will be subject to a floor of 20% 






- Equities (including 
convertible bonds) 
which are not 
included in a main 
index but which are 
listed on a recognised 
exchange. 
- UCITS/mutual funds 
which include such 
equities. 
- In this approach, the exposure amount after risk mitigation is calculated as 
follows: 
E* = max. {0, [E · (1 + He) - C · (1 - Hc - Hfx)]}         [1] 
where: 
E*= the exposure value after risk mitigation. 
E= current value of the exposure. 
He= haircut appropriate to the exposure (exposure amounts may vary 
where, for example, securities are being lent). 
C= the current value of the collateral received. 
Hc= haircut appropriate to the collateral. 
Hfx= haircut appropriate for currency mismatch between the collateral and 
exposure. 
The exposure amount after risk mitigation will be multiplied by the risk 
weight of the counterparty to obtain the risk-weighted asset amount for the 
collateralised transaction. 
- The haircuts (H) are calculated in function of the volatility of the collateral, 
its quality and period of maintenance. 
- Standard supervisory haircuts:  
- Assuming daily mark-to-market, daily remargining and a 10-business day 
holding period; in this case, the discount ranges from 0.5%, for sovereign 
debt issues with AAA/AA rating with a residual maturity of less than one 
year, up to 25% for equities not included in main indices. In the case of 
cash, the value of the haircut is 0. 
 If the exposure and the collateral are denominated in different 
currencies, the standard supervisor discount applicable in respect of 
currency risk will be 8%. 
- Own estimates for haircuts: 
 Supervisors may permit banks to calculate haircuts using their own 
internal estimates of market prices volatility and foreign exchange 
volatility. 
 To be authorised to do this, the financial entities must satisfy minimum 
criteria of qualitative and quantitative nature (paragraphs 156 to 165 
of BII). 
- Adjustments are established when the period elapsed between the 
valuations of the assets at market price (or the repositions of margins, if 
applicable) exceeds the minimum permitted.  
Foundation IRB approach 
All the preceding 
conditions  
- In the case of the existence of an eligible IRB financial collateral only the Comprehensive 
approach is permitted, which is applied to the LGD, reducing it to: 
LGD* = LGD x (E* / E)                                              [2] 
where: 
 LGD is that of the senior unsecured exposure before recognition of collateral (45%); 
 E is the current value of the exposure (i.e. cash lent or securities lent or posted); 
 E* is the exposure value after risk mitigation, in accordance with the standardised 
approach. This concept is only utilised to calculate LGD*.  
 Banks must continue to calculate EAD without taking into account the presence of any 
collateral, unless otherwise specified. 
Advanced IRB approach 
All the assets - The financial entity makes its own estimate of the associated LGD. 
- In its analysis, the financial entity must consider the degree of any dependence that may 
exist between the risk of the borrower and the risk of the collateral. When a significant degree 
of dependence exists, a conservative treatment will have to be applied.  
- Any currency mismatch between the underlying obligation and the collateral must also be 
taken into account and treated conservatively. 
- The estimates of LGD will be based on the historical rates of recovery and, wherever possible, 
must not be based exclusively on the estimated market value of the collateral.  
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Table 2. Guarantees and credit derivatives. 
 
 Eligible guarantors/protection providers Calculation of the CR 
Standardised 
Approach 
- The guarantor can be: sovereign 
entities, Public sector entities, banks 
and securities firms with a lower risk 
weight than the counterparty; 
- Companies (including insurance 
companies) with A- or better rating.  
- The only credit derivatives admitted are: 
credit default swaps and total return 
swaps. The cash funded credit linked 
notes are treated as cash collateralised 
transactions. 
- The risk weighting of the guarantor is 
assigned to the protected part, while 
the original weighting is assigned to the 
rest of the position. 
- Proportional cover is recognised, by 
tranches, in respect of the difference 
between currencies and the possible 
maturity mismatches. 
- Special treatment for sovereign 




- The range of eligible guarantors and 
credit derivatives is the same as under 
the standardised approach, but the 
internal ratings are utilised, in place of 
the external, for determining whether or 
not a guarantor is acceptable.  
 
- The risk weighting will be derived from 
the covered part of the loan utilising: 
a) the risk-weight function appropriate to 
the type of guarantor, and  
b) the PD appropriate to the guarantor’s 
borrower grade, or some grade 
between the underlying obligor and the 
guarantor’s borrower grade if the bank 
deems a full substitution treatment not 




- The same as the foundation IRB 
approach. However, if the financial 
entity chooses to adjust its LGD to 
reflect the guarantee, the range of 
eligible guarantors is not limited, 
although they must meet a series of 
minimum requirements (paragraphs 483 
and 484 relating to the type of 
guarantee, paragraphs 488 and 489 for 
the credit derivatives). 
- Adjustments will be made to the 
estimates of PD or LGD.  
- The effect of double default must not 
be included in these adjustments.  
- Retail portfolio: There is no difference 
between the foundation and advanced 
IRB approach. The financial entity must 
reflect the effect of the guarantee on its 
estimates of PD or LGD.  
 
 
Table 3. Exposures secured by mortgage. 
 
 Eligible property Calculation of the CR 
- Residential property - Weighting of 35% 
- Commercial property - Weighting of 100% 
Standardised 
Approach 
- Exceptional case: Commercial property 
with particular characteristics 
(paragraph 74, BII). 
 
- Weighting of 50% for the part of 
the loan that does not exceed 
the lower of the following two 
values: 50% of the market 
value, and 60% of the value of 
the mortgage on the property 
guaranteeing the loan 
- Particular types of property are eligible 
as IRB collateral, provided a series of 
minimum requirements are met 
(paragraphs 509 to 524, BII). 
- The LGD is reduced by up to 35-
40%, according to the case (see 
paragraph 295, BII). Foundation 
IRB 
approach - Again, in exceptional circumstances, 
mortgages on some commercial 
property are recognised. 
- The LGD corresponding to the 
collateralised part of these 




- The treatment of exposures secured by 
mortgage generally is that presented for 
the rest of the assets, as described in 
table 1. 
- A specific formulation is 
established for the case of retail 




Table 4. Standardised approach: Regulatory capital for an SME.  
 
 Capital Requirements 
The financing of SMEs may be included in one of two 






- Risk weighting according to credit rating: 
 20% (AAA to AA-) 
 50% (A+ to A-) 
 100% (BBB+ to BB-) 
 150% (Lower than BB-) 
 100% (Not rated) 
 
EXAMPLE: For a exposure of €10 million, the CR 
would vary between: 
 
   €160,000 =  (8% x 20% x €10 million) 
€1,200,000 = (8% x 150% x €10 million) 
B) Retail: Conditions:  
 
i) Maximum aggregate exposure ≤ €1 million, and  
ii) It forms part of a diversified portfolio (aggregate 
exposure to one counterpart less than 0.2% of the 
overall regulatory retail portfolio). 
- Risk weighting of 75%, except for past due 
loans. 
- EXAMPLE: For a loan of €100,000 to an SME, the 
financial entities must assign €6,000 as 
regulatory capital (8% x 75% x €100,000), 




Table 5. IRB approach: Regulatory capital for an SME. 
 










































































  [4] 
B) Retail 
Condition: The 
total exposure of 
the banking group 
to a small business 
borrower (on a 
consolidated basis 
where applicable) 
is less than €1 
million. 
























































                      [6] 
Where: 
CR: Capital requirement or regulatory capital, as a percentage of the EAD 
LGD: Loss given default 
N (x): Cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable 
R: Asset Correlation 
G (z): Inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable 
PD:  Probability of default 
M: Maturity of the operation 
b: Maturity adjustment 




Table 6. IRB approach: Capital requirements for SMEs (as corporate). 
 
PD S R LGD M b CR RWA 
0.03% ≤ 5 0.19821 45% 2.5 0.316834 0.96% 11.98% 
20.00% ≤ 5 0.08001 45% 2.5 0.042719 15.98% 199.72% 
0.03% 30 0.22044 45% 2.5 0.316834 1.10% 13.79% 
20.00% 30 0.10223 45% 2.5 0.042719 18.42% 230.24% 
0.03% 50 0.23821 45% 2.5 0.316834 1.22% 15.31% 
20.00% 50 0.12001 45% 2.5 0.042719 20.20% 252.53% 
 
 
Table 7. IRB approach: Capital requirements for SMEs (as retail). 
 
PD R LGD CR RWA 
0.03% 0.15864 45% 0.38% 4.72% 
20.00% 0.03012 45% 8.50% 106.29% 
 
Table 8. Credit risk premiums, as a percentage of the EAD. 
 
STANDARDISED APPROACH 
Unrated claims on corporates 





0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 8.00% 1.59% 1.61% 
20.00% 45.00% 9.00% 19.90% 8.00% 1.59% 10.59% 
Retail 
0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 6.00% 1.19% 1.21% 
20.00% 45.00% 9.00% 19.90% 6.00% 1.19% 10.19% 
IRB APPROACH 
Corporates with sales ≤ €5 million 
0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 0.96% 0.19% 0.20% 
20.00% 45.00% 9.00% 19.90% 15.98% 3.18% 12.18% 
Corporates with sales of €30 million 
0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 1.10% 0.22% 0.23% 
20.00% 45.00% 9.00% 19.90% 18.42% 3.67% 12.67% 
Corporates with sales of €50 million 
0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 1.22% 0.24% 0.26% 
20.00% 45.00% 9.00% 19.90% 20.20% 4.02% 13.02% 
Retail 
0.03% 45.00% 0.01% 19.90% 0.38% 0.08% 0.09% 


















(from 50 to 249 
empl.) 
Credit risk mitigation required 69.4% 85.16% 65.06% 50.85% 
Guarantees not associated with the 
business 
56.37% 68.6% 54.5% 29.7% 
Guarantees associated with the 
business 
20.36% 17.9% 25.41% 13.5% 
Collateral not associated with the 
business 
17.95% 20.54% 15% 16.2% 
Collateral associated with the 
business 
19.78% 15.18% 20.83% 32.43% 
Source: Cardone, Casasola & Samartin (2005)  
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Table 11. EL in credit risk premiums for SMEs. 
 
Total Exposure ≥  €1 M 
SME without guarantee  SME guaranteed by an LGA 
PD SME LGD 
EL (1): 
PD x LGD 
PD LGA LGD 
EL (2): 
PD x LGD 
Difference 
EL 
(2) – (1) 
2.64% 45.00% 1.19% 0.03% 45.00% 0.01% -1.17% 
2.64% 45.00% 1.19% 3.00% 45.00% 1.35% 0.16% 
Total Exposure <  €1 M 
2.92% 45.00% 1.31% 0.03% 45.00% 0.01% -1.30% 








SME without guarantee SME guaranteed by an LGA 
ROE 
CR ROE x CR (1) CR ROE x CR (2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
19.90% 8.00% 1.59% 1.60% 0.32% -1.27% 
Retail 
19.90% 6.00% 1.19% 1.60% 0.32% -0.88% 
 
 
Table 13. IRB Approach: Component of UL in credit risk premiums for SMEs. 
 
Unrated corporates without guarantee 
PD SME S R LGD M b CR ROE ROE x CR 
2.64% ≤ 5 0.11206 45% 2.5 0.100877 8.03% 19.9% 1,60% 
2.64% 30 0.13428 45% 2.5 0.100877 9.40% 19.9% 1,87% 
2.64% 50 0.15206 45% 2.5 0.100877 10.51% 19.9% 2,09% 
Retail without guarantee 
PD SME R LGD CR ROE ROE x CR 
2.92% 0.07678 45% 5.30% 19.9% 1.06% 
SMEs guaranteed by an LGA 
PD LGA R LGD M b CR ROE ROE x CR 
0.03% 0.23821 45% 2.5 0.316834 1.22% 19.9% 0.24% 




Table 14. Credit risk premiums for SMEs guaranteed by an LGA, as a percentage of the EAD. 
 
 
 SMEs without guarantee SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with PD = 0.03% SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with PD = 0.71% 









(2) – (1)  





(3) – (1) 
RPcorp ST 1.19% 1.59% 2.78% 0.01% 0.32% 0.33% -2.45% 0.32% 0.32% 0.64% -2.14% 
RPretail ST 1.31% 1.19% 2.51% 0.01% 0.32% 0.33% -2.18% 0.32% 0.32% 0.64% -1.87% 
RPcorp. S= 5 (IRB) 1.19% 1.60% 2.79% 0.01% 0.24% 0.26% -2.53% 0.32% 1.37% 1.69% -1.10% 
RPcorp. S=30 (IRB) 1.19% 1.87% 3.06% 0.01% 0.24% 0.26% -2.80% 0.32% 1.37% 1.69% -1.37% 
RPcorp. S=50 (IRB) 1.19% 2.09% 3.28% 0.01% 0.24% 0.26% -3.02% 0.32% 1.37% 1.69% -1.59% 
RPretail IRB 1.31% 1.06% 2.37% 0.01% 0.24% 0.26% -2.11% 0.32% 1.37% 1.69% -0.68% 
 
 SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with PD = 1.1% SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with PD = 2.64% SMEs guaranteed by an LGA with PD = 3.35% 





(4) – (1)  





(5) – (1) 





(6) – (1)  
RPcorp ST 0.50% 0.32% 0.81% -1.97% 1.19% 0.32% 1.51% -1.27% 1.51% 0.32% 1.83% -0.95% 
RPretail ST 0.50% 0.32% 0.81% -1.69% 1.19% 0.32% 1.51% -1.00% 1.51% 0.32% 1.83% -0.68% 
RPcorp. S= 5 (IRB) 0.50% 1.61% 2.11% -0.68% 1.19% 2.09% 3.28% 0.50% 1.51% 2.24% 3.74% 0.96% 
RPcorp. S=30 (IRB) 0.50% 1.61% 2.11% -0.95% 1.19% 2.09% 3.28% 0.22% 1.51% 2.24% 3.74% 0.68% 
RPcorp. S=50 (IRB) 0.50% 1.61% 2.11% -1.17% 1.19% 2.09% 3.28% 0.00% 1.51% 2.24% 3.74% 0.46% 





RPcorp ST:      Credit risk premium for an unrated SME included in the corporate category, in the Standardised approach. 
RPretail ST:     Credit risk premium for an SME included in the retail category, in the Standardised approach. 
RPcorp, S = 5: Credit risk premium for an SME with annual sales of less than or equal to €5 million included in the corporate category (IRB approach).  
RPcorp, S=30: Credit risk premium for an SME with annual sales of €30 million included in the corporate category (IRB approach). 
RPcorp, S=50: Credit risk premium for an SME with annual sales of €50 million included in the corporate category (IRB approach). 




Table 15. Effective annual cost (IRR) of the LGA guarantee (data for Spain, 
2007). 
 
Amount of the Guarantee (A) €66,000  
Study commission (SC) 0.5% 
Guarantee commission (GC) 1.0% 
Contribution to the Capital of the LGA (SQ) 1.0% 
Rate of interest (i) 6.0% 
Term of the loan (n) 8 years 
Effective cost of the guarantee (IRR) 0.68% 
Source: CESGAR (2008) 
 
 
